Does embodiment prevent unbiased moral decisions?
For the individual taking the decision? For its network of similarly embodied moral decision makers?
Embodiment provides an egocentric viewpoint but does not necessarily prevent from generating and using an allocentric viewpoint. Yet, survival of the embodied organism will most likely makes itself part of the priorities. The same would apply to whatever helps it to survive, e.g. others. The question applies to, at least, human beings, biological organisms at large and robotics.
See also The implications of embodiment for behavior and cognition: animal and robotic case studies by Matej Hoffmann and Rolf Pfeifer http://arxiv.org/abs/1202
Embodiment provides an egocentric viewpoint but does not necessarily prevent from generating and using an allocentric viewpoint. Yet, survival of the embodied organism will most likely makes itself part of the priorities. The same would apply to whatever helps it to survive, e.g. others. The question applies to, at least, human beings, biological organisms at large and robotics.
See also The implications of embodiment for behavior and cognition: animal and robotic case studies by Matej Hoffmann and Rolf Pfeifer http://arxiv.org/abs/1202
1 Answer
I'd say that embodiment is essential for unbiased moral decisions, insofar as they are even possible.
The traditional assumption is that moral knowledge (or ethics) does not exist in an egocentric perspective but must be developed (or "acquired", as sometimes said in the case of language and conceptual knowledge) via a disembodied cognitive process.
In keeping with an embodied epistemology, there are no absolute or unembodied perspectives. Embodiment is not optional. There are primordial, structural perspectives that are a consequence of the common nature and design shared by a community of agents. More comprehensive ones are acquired (or not) through a developmental process we call "experience".
The traditional assumption is that moral knowledge (or ethics) does not exist in an egocentric perspective but must be developed (or "acquired", as sometimes said in the case of language and conceptual knowledge) via a disembodied cognitive process.
In keeping with an embodied epistemology, there are no absolute or unembodied perspectives. Embodiment is not optional. There are primordial, structural perspectives that are a consequence of the common nature and design shared by a community of agents. More comprehensive ones are acquired (or not) through a developmental process we call "experience".
